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Abstract 
This paper aims at achieving a better understanding of rental housing market discrimination 
against ethnic minorities. There remain substantial lacunae in the scientific knowledge about 
the association between the concentration of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood and 
discrimination, and possible differences in discrimination based on host society language 
proficiency. Although these associations have been considered in the U.S., they have been 
neglected in the European context, which is quite different. A telephone survey offered data 
on 579 properties that is linked to (1) whether the fictitious ethnic minority candidate masters 
the host society language or not, (2) the rent of the offered unit, (3) the percentage of 
minorities in the neighbourhood and (4) the socioeconomic background of the neighbourhood. 
Using multilevel modelling, we found (1) that host society language proficient migrants are 
discriminated against as often as non-proficient migrants and found (2) a curvilinear 
association between rent and discrimination, with more discrimination for both cheaper and 
more expensive rental offers. We found (3) no association between the presence of minorities 
in the neighbourhood and the occurrence of discrimination, contrary to previous research in 
the U.S., and found (4) no association between discrimination and the socioeconomic 
background of a neighbourhood. 
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Introduction 
Previous research has repeatedly demonstrated the persistence of ethnic discrimination in the 
rental housing market, i.e. the unequal treatment of individuals belonging to certain ethnic 
groups (Pager and Shepherd 2008; Zick, Pettigrew, and Wagner 2008). Although it is seen as 
illegal in most countries (De Prins, Sottiaux, and Vrielink 2005), discrimination abounds in 
both the U.S. (Kuebler and Rugh 2013) and Europe (TNS 2012). The negative consequences 
of ethnic discrimination are numerous. Perceived ethnic discrimination is, for instance, 
associated with worse mental and physical health (Missinne and Bracke 2012; Pascoe and 
Richman 2009). Moreover, discrimination makes the acculturation of ethnic minorities more 
difficult (Berry, Phinney, Sam, and Vedder 2006) and, when considering labour market 
discrimination, results in socioeconomic status (SES) disadvantages (Wilson, Tienda, and Wu 
1995). Specifically, housing market discrimination makes the search for housing more costly 
and time consuming for ethnic minorities (Roscigno, Karafin, and Tester 2009). 
Ethnic discrimination in the housing market is also considered one of the causes of ethnic 
residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1988). Landlords and real estate agents may for 
instance discriminate against ethnic minorities in white neighbourhoods to keep these 
neighbourhoods white. Although ethnic segregation can have positive effects as well 
(Fleischmann, Phalet, Deboosere, and Neels 2012), living in a segregated neighbourhood may 
have negative health outcomes, lead to more experiences with criminality (Sampson, 
Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002), have negative SES outcomes (Kasinitz and Rosenberg 
1996) and can make acculturation more difficult (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007). Although 
theoretically connected and broadly accepted, research that investigates the link between 
housing market discrimination and ethnic residential segregation is scarce (Dawkins 2004). 
Moreover, the available body of research that examines the link between discrimination and 
segregation is limited to the U.S. The European context is highly different, however, with 
3 
 
different migration histories (Zick et al. 2008) and lower levels of ethnic residential 
segregation (Van Kempen and Murie 2009). Although previous studies have examined the 
occurrence of ethnic discrimination in the housing market in Europe (Ahmed and 
Hammarstedt 2008; Baldini and Federici 2011; Bosch, Carnero, and Farre 2010), the link with 
segregation has not yet been examined. 
This article aims at investigating the link between segregation and discrimination, thereby 
helping to fill one of the major lacunae in knowledge about residential segregation. 
Furthermore, we aim to add to scientific knowledge by examining discrimination based on 
ethnic minorities’ host society language proficiency. To investigate this link we examine a 
self-conducted telephone audit study of Flanders’ two largest cities, Antwerp and Ghent, in 
which the two ethnic minority candidates—one with a foreign accent and one without—and 
an ethnic majority member called landlords or real estate agents to inquire about vacant 
housing found on the Internet. We apply multilevel models to 579 individual properties to test 
the association between discrimination and language proficiency, rent and ethnic and 
socioeconomic residential segregation. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Discrimination in the housing market, and other consumer markets, has predominantly been 
studied by economists (Yinger 1998). Economic theorists distinguish between statistical and 
taste discrimination (Becker 1957; Phelps 1972). Statistical discrimination occurs when the 
people who have to make certain decisions lack information to assess the consequences of 
these decisions. Employers, for instance, decide between job applicants, without reliable 
information regarding the specific productivity of each candidate. Decisions are then based 
on, for instance, educational levels and experience in certain jobs. Likewise, lessors need to 
choose between candidate-renters without reliable information on for instance future 
employment and hence possible rent payment problems. To counter this lack of information, 
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lessors build on ideas of the group to which the candidate belongs to. Lessors could for 
instance expect higher educated candidates to have less payment problems than lower 
educated candidates. Taste discrimination, on the other hand, is the case when lessors 
discriminate based on preferences towards certain groups, regardless of the availability of 
information (Ahmed et al. 2010). Previous research in Europe has delivered mixed results: 
providing more information concerning the candidate reduces ethnic minority discrimination 
in Spain (Bosch et al. 2010), while discrimination of Arabs in Sweden persists (Ahmed et al. 
2010).  
Host society language proficiency of migrants could be one characteristic which can lead to 
differences in discrimination, given that differences in language proficiency might signal 
differences in migrant integration to lessors. Indeed, migrants who master the language of the 
host society better, attain higher educational levels and have higher employment probabilities 
(Dustmann and Fabbri 2003). Based on the theory on statistical discrimination, we would 
expect that lessors tend to discriminate migrants with a lower language proficiency more 
often, given that they would rely on general ideas about the integration of the average person 
in the group to which these migrants belong. Previous research indeed found this relationship 
between the level of language proficiency and rental housing market discrimination in the US 
(e.g. Hanson and Santas forthcoming).  
Therefore, we expect that better language proficiency is associated with lower levels of 
discrimination (H1).  
In Western Europe, ethnicity and SES are strongly associated: ethnic minorities often have a 
lower SES and specific disadvantages compared to the ethnic majority (Heath, Rothon, and 
Kilpi 2008). According to statistical discrimination theory, lessors might expect migrants to 
have payment problems, if they base their ideas on the average ethnic minority member. As 
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this perception of ethnic minorities would create more problems in the higher tier of the rental 
market, we could expect a higher incidence of discrimination for properties with a higher rent. 
A tendency towards this process is apparent in the US, where real estate agents steer black 
candidate-buyers towards lower priced properties (Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger 2003).  
Previous studies on the link between housing unit prices and discrimination against minorities 
offer mixed results. In Europe, Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) found that the occurrence of 
discrimination against Arabs in the rental market in Sweden increased when prices rose, but 
neither Baldini and Federici (2011) nor Bosch and colleagues (2010) could find a connection 
between the rent and the occurrence of discrimination against Eastern Europeans and Arabs in 
Italy or against Moroccans in Spain. While in the American housing market, Hanson and 
Santas (forthcoming) have found that rental discrimination against non-assimilated Hispanics 
was higher for the cheapest houses than average-priced units. Ondrich and colleagues (2003) 
found that African Americans are discriminated against more when the asking price of a unit 
increases on the sales market. Page (1995) came to the same conclusion for African 
Americans in both the American rental and sales market, but found no connection when 
considering differential treatment of Hispanics and Whites.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that discrimination is more prevalent among more expensive rental 
offers (H2). 
‘White flight’ describes the process whereby majority-member inhabitants flee (i.e. move 
away) from ethnically mixed neighbourhoods (Frey 1979). Research suggests there are many 
factors beyond the size of an ethnic group that explain this tendency (for example, the number 
of different ethnic groups: Crowder, Pais, and South 2012; or stark increases in the number of 
ethnic minorities: Frey and Liaw 1998). Still, most scholars argue that the percentage of 
ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood plays a meaningful role (Crowder and South 2008). 
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Neighbourhoods with a higher percentage of ethnic minorities (Card, Mas, and Rothstein 
2008), they often experience a rapid population turnover caused by the moving out of ethnic 
majority members. This leads to ethnic minority segregated neighbourhoods. Living in such 
neighbourhoods is less attractive because, as stated, this can have negative health outcomes, 
leads to more experiences with criminality (Sampson et al. 2002) and has negative SES 
outcomes (Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996). Furthermore, the transition from a predominantly 
white neighbourhood to an integrated or minority segregated neighbourhood causes drops in 
housing prices (Chambers 1992). Moreover, landlords or real estate agents may consider this 
preferred ethnic composition when dealing with renters out of fear of losing other majority-
member candidates, thus limiting the pool of candidates even more (Yinger 1986). Therefore 
landlords or real estate agents may try to avoid increases in the percentage of ethnic minorities 
in a neighbourhood by offering housing to the ethnic majority only in order to maintain 
property value, resulting in discrimination against ethnic minorities.  
Several studies have found an association between the percentage of ethnic minorities in the 
neighbourhood and the occurrence of housing discrimination. When studying the Boston 
housing market of 1981, Yinger (1986) found a high level of discrimination against Blacks 
and Hispanics in completely white neighbourhoods, but almost non-existent discrimination in 
neighbourhoods undergoing racial transition. Page (1995), Ondrich and colleagues (2003) and 
Hanson and Hawley (2011) have found a connection between a neighbourhood’s share of 
minorities and discrimination against either Blacks, Hispanics or both in the sales and rental 
market in the U.S. Finally, Hanson and Santas (forthcoming) have found the same for non-
assimilated Hispanics in the U.S. rental market.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that discrimination is more prevalent in neighbourhoods with a 
lower share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood (H3). 
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There are other explanations for white flight as well. Scholars who follow the racial proxy 
hypothesis (Clark 1986) or the race-based neighbourhood stereotyping (Ellen 2000) ignore the 
increase of ethnic minority members and point instead to the consequences of these 
increases—the negative health outcomes of living in segregated neighbourhoods, the higher 
crime rates or the higher number of welfare-dependent inhabitants living in the 
neighbourhood—as an explanation for white flight. Many of the negative consequences are 
connected not only to race or ethnicity, but also to the socioeconomic background of the 
neighbourhood. Moreover, there are researchers who claim that it is not the ethnicity of 
neighbourhood inhabitants or factors related to ethnicity, but the lower SES many of these 
ethnic minority-member inhabitants have that make majority members move away (van Ham 
and Feijten 2008). Therefore, lessors might discriminate more often in neighbourhoods with a 
higher SES, based on the assessment that ethnic minorities have a lower SES. This is apparent 
in the U.S., where Blacks are ‘class steered’ (Turner and Ross 2005), i.e. directed to 
neighbourhoods with a lower SES and a higher share of minorities compared to White home 
seekers with the same SES.  
Therefore we predict that the occurrence of discrimination against minorities is higher in 
neighbourhoods with a higher SES (H4).  
Context 
Antwerp and Ghent are Flanders’ two biggest cities, with 511,716 and 247,941 inhabitants, 
respectively, at the start of 2013. A total of 168,638 inhabitants (32.57%) in Antwerp and of 
47,772 inhabitants (19.72%) in Ghent belong to an ethnic minority group that stems from 
migration. In Antwerp, most migrants originate from Morocco (58,021), Turkey (19,734), 
Poland (10,892), ex-Yugoslavian countries (8,931) and Russia (6,980). In Ghent, there is also 
a large representation of both Turkish and Maghreb minorities (15,596 Turkish, 3,231 
Moroccan and 1,069 Tunisian inhabitants), and migrants stemming from Bulgaria (6,414), 
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Slovakia (1,854) and Poland (1,367). The Maghreb and Turkish minorities are an older 
migrant groups that began arriving as guest workers or via family reunification in the 1960s; 
the Eastern and Central European migrants arrived only during the last two decades, due to 
the enlargement of the European Union (2004 and 2007) or the Yugoslavian civil wars 
(especially the Bosnian War, 1992–1995, and the Kosovo War, 1998–1999). 
In both cities, ethnic minorities live residentially segregated, although the segregation of 
minorities originating from Turkey and the Maghreb and from Eastern and Central European 
countries is declining. In Ghent, the segregation indices of all groups declined more than 10 
percentage points over a period of 10 years (Verhaeghe, Van Der Bracht, and Van de Putte 
2012). In Antwerp, the segregation indices of the Turkish and Moroccan migrants declined 
more than 5 percentage points over a period of 5 years.
2
 In Ghent, Turkish, Maghrebi, 
Bulgarian and Slovakian minorities live concentrated in the same neighbourhoods; in 
Antwerp, however, the various ethnic groups are concentrated in different neighbourhoods. 
These segregated neighbourhoods are mostly situated in the most deteriorated parts of town: 
the nineteenth-century belt in Ghent and the neighbourhoods around the Antwerp traffic belt. 
This may be explained by lower rent and the presence of industrial infrastructure close to 
these neighbourhoods. The neighbourhoods with the lowest share of minorities and highest 
SES are situated in the annexed agglomeration of villages, where the houses are of better 
quality and higher priced, and housing density is low.  
Data 
We conducted a telephone audit study among real estate agents and private landlords who 
rented out residential property in Antwerp or Ghent during April and May 2013. Available 
property was selected from IMMOWEB, one of the major real estate advertising websites in 
Belgium with, according to their website, over 150,000 real estate advertisements. All 
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properties with a rent below €2,000 per month were eligible for the study. Eventually a total 
of 3,102 properties were recorded as eligible. To minimize suspicion among real estate agents 
and landlords, landlords or real estate agents were contacted about only one property. If 
lessors had more than one property available, we randomly selected one advertisement from 
the list. We retained 1,129 different advertisements after this selection. Those lessors were 
contacted by telephone. Nonresponse, that is, lessors who could not be contacted by all three 
test persons, was avoided by maximizing contact attempts: each test person attempted a 
maximum of five contacts per advertisement. A total of 4,997 successful and unsuccessful 
contact attempts by three different test persons were registered. This resulted in a response 
rate of 88%. Given that lessors indicated that the property was no longer available for a 
substantial 41.5% of the 994 successfully contacted properties, the total number of properties 
for which data on ethnic discrimination could be gathered was 579. 
Each of these 579 lessors was contacted by three different test persons. The three test persons 
represent three different profiles: (1) an ethnic minority member with a noticeable foreign 
accent, (2) an ethnic minority member without a foreign accent and (3) an ethnic Belgian. All 
three test persons were male. For the first test person, we selected a first-generation migrant. 
This test person’s mastery of Dutch was sufficient to pursue academic education and he 
exhibited a noticeable foreign accent in spoken Dutch. This person was also given a fictitious 
Arabic-sounding name. The second test person was an ethnic Belgian who was given an 
Arabic-sounding name. This way, we made sure he had perfect language mastery and no 
foreign accent. Including these two test persons enabled us to disentangle the influence of 
having less host society language proficiency and a foreign accent from having a foreign 
name. The third test person was an ethnic Belgian who was given a fictional Belgian name. 
As already indicated, a substantial number of properties had already been rented out at the 
moment of contact, though the advertisement was still displayed. Housing market 
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discrimination is often subtle (Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger 2000). Ethnic minority candidates 
are, for example often inaccurately told that the property which they applied for is no longer 
available. By including this third test person, who served as a control person, we were able to 
assess whether the property was really unavailable. Therefore, the third test person contacted 
a lessor only after each of the first two test persons successfully contacted the lessor. To 
minimize the risk that properties became available again between the telephone calls of the 
ethnic minority test persons and the third test person, the time between these telephone 
conversations was minimized to a few hours. 
Each test person was given an identical fictitious identity: the only variation was the name and 
accent. We performed conservative tests of ethnic discrimination by creating profiles for 
which discrimination was unlikely. According to this fictitious identity, each candidate had 
Belgian nationality, was married, had neither children nor pets, was a non-smoker, had a 
stable, full-time employment contract and was part of a dual earning household with a 
combined net income of €3,000 per month.3 These candidates were considered good 
candidates for all properties with a rent below €2,000. The test persons were instructed to 
begin each telephone contact by introducing themselves by their name. Subsequently, they 
had to ask whether the property was still available for rent and if it would be possible to visit 
the property. If the answer was positive, test persons were instructed not to make an actual 
appointment to visit the property, to reduce discomfort for lessors. No further information 
regarding the aforementioned fictitious identity was supplied unless specifically asked for by 
the lessors. If asked, test persons recorded which questions were raised. All answers by 
landlords, both negative and positive, were fully recorded in writing in the words of the test 
persons. Each test person was adequately trained to follow these instructions and was 
evaluated frequently during the fieldwork.  
                                                 
3
 Which is around the average net income for people living in Flanders (ADSEI 2013). 
11 
 
Working with telephone audits has some advantages over e-mail audits, which have become 
increasingly popular in the research literature over the last few years (Ahmed and 
Hammarstedt 2008; Hanson and Hawley 2011). First, the use of spoken language enables us 
to disentangle the effect of having a foreign accent from simply having a foreign-sounding 
name. Although there have been attempts to simulate this in written language, we are 
convinced that the distinction due to host society language proficiency can be made more 
accurately based on spoken language. Second, real estate markets in Belgium, and possibly 
abroad also, still operate primarily by telephone, less often via e-mail. Moreover, nonresponse 
is generally lower for telephone contacts, as is reflected in our response rate of 88%.  
We chose for a matched pair audit, in which each test person called each lessor, to maximize 
the sample size. Moreover, given that a high share of the properties was already rented out at 
the time of the telephone calls, it would be difficult to disentangle actually rented out 
properties from ethnic discrimination. Furthermore, matched pair audits are quite common in 
research into labour and housing market discrimination (Heckman 1998).  
One of the major disadvantages is that the behaviour of test persons is less standardized than 
in the case of completely identical e-mail messages. The impact of this limitation was reduced 
by closely monitoring the behaviour of our different test persons. A second disadvantage is 
that the ethnic origin of the second test person was signalled to lessors only by his name. If 
the name itself was misunderstood during the telephone conversation, it could result in an 
underestimation of ethnic discrimination for ethnic minorities without a foreign accent. This 
would mean we overestimated the gap in ethnic discrimination due to language proficiency.  
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
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Our dependent variable is based on a difference in the answers given by the lessors. If either 
one or both ethnic minority candidates were not invited to visit the property, but the ethnic 
Belgian candidate received an invitation during a telephone conversation at a later time, we 
consider this ethnic discrimination. We therefore constructed a dichotomous variable—ethnic 
discrimination—that indicated whether discrimination took place (i.e. value 1) or not (i.e. 
value 0). 
To assess a difference in discrimination due to host society language proficiency among 
ethnic minorities, we also constructed two dichotomous variables which indicate 
discrimination against each test person separately: with accent and no accent. These variables 
are comparable to the dependent variable: a score of 0 indicates no discrimination, whereas a 
score of 1 means direct discrimination.  
Independent Variables 
The independent variables regarding the property are based on the self-administered 
information supplied by the lessors. We recorded information only from the standard 
information fields of the IMMOWEB website. These include type, rent, size, lessor and city. 
Type is a categorical variable with three categories: studio apartment, apartment and house. 
Rent is a metric variable indicating the monthly fee to rent the property. This rent excludes 
additional costs for water, electricity and heating. The rents range from €325 to €1,950 per 
month, with an average of €762.6. We divided the rent by 100 so that the order of magnitude 
of the variance corresponds more closely to the odds of the dependent variables (Hox 2010). 
Size is a numerical variable, indicating the number of bedrooms for each property.
4
 For studio 
apartments, which usually have no separate bedroom, lessors often do not disclose the number 
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of bedrooms. Therefore, we assigned a number of 0 bedrooms to studio apartments. The 
number of bedrooms ranges from 0 to 6. 
Lessor is a dichotomous variable, indicating whether the property is rented out by a real estate 
agent or a private landlord.  
City is a dichotomous variable with two categories: Antwerp and Ghent. 
In most cases, lessors also provided an exact address for the property. If they did not, the last 
test person inquired after the address. This address enabled us to assign each property to a 
statistical sector. Statistical sectors are the smallest unit of the Belgian territory for which 
socioeconomic statistics are calculated. In total, Belgium has 19,781 statistical sectors, with 
Antwerp having 299 and Ghent 201. With an average of 0.68 km² in Antwerp and 0.78 km² in 
Ghent, this territorial subdivision corresponds best with what constitutes a neighbourhood.  
The availability of socioeconomic information at this neighbourhood level also enables us to 
test whether neighbourhood characteristics influence housing market discrimination against 
migrants. The variables were collected externally from the ‘Buurtmonitoren’, publically 
available statistics websites containing information at the neighbourhood level, derived from 
the federal statistics department.
5
 
Percentage migrants is a metric variable, indicating the percentage of inhabitants without 
Belgian nationality per neighbourhood. Because a considerable percentage of ethnic 
minorities have attained Belgian nationality, the percentage of foreign nationals is an 
underestimation of the percentage of ethnic minorities. Antwerp and Ghent have different 
definitions of ethnic origin and hence ethnic minority status, meaning that a comparable 
                                                                                                                                                        
surface was often missing. Therefore, we relied on the number of bedrooms as an indicator of size. However, 
surface and number of bedrooms were correlated 0.676, which indicates that number of bedrooms is a good 
proxy to determine the size of property. 
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ethnic minority variable is unavailable for the two cities. However, the two different ethnic 
minority variables of Ghent and Antwerp are both highly correlated with the percentage of 
foreign nationals per neighbourhood in each city.
6
 Therefore, the percentage of migrants is a 
good approximation of the percentage of ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood. 
Median income is a metric variable, indicating the median net yearly income of all inhabitants 
in the neighbourhood. The variable is expressed in euros, and divided by 10,000 so that the 
order of magnitude of the variance corresponds more closely to the odds of the dependent 
variables (Hox 2010). This variable gives an indication of neighbourhood wealth.  
Method 
Given that properties are nested within neighbourhoods, we apply multilevel models. 
Therefore, we present two-level models: the (1) 579 properties are nested within (2) 199 
different neighbourhoods.
7
 Since our dependent variables are dichotomous, we estimate 
logistic multilevel models. Models were estimated using the MLwiN software package by 
applying the second-order penalized quasi-likelihood algorithm. We present two different 
models. First, we present a null-model, containing only the intercept, which enables us to 
decompose the variance at each level. In other words: this enables us to assess which 
proportion of the odds of being discriminated against is due to the neighbourhood where the 
property is situated on the one hand and which proportion is due to the property itself on the 
other hand. In the second model, we introduce all variables at the property- and the 
neighbourhood-level. For each model we display log odds, variance components and the 
standard errors of both. Log odds can be interpreted as the likelihood that an event occurs 
versus the likelihood that an event does not occur. A log odds higher than zero indicates that 
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 Although there are on average relatively few properties per neighbourhood, additional analyses limited to the 
neighbourhoods with at least 3 properties reveal the same results. Analyses not shown but available upon request 
from the authors. 
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being discriminated against is more likely than not being discriminated against. A negative 
log odds of, for instance, size means that for properties with a higher number of bedrooms, the 
likelihood of being discriminated against is lower than for properties with a lower number of 
bedrooms. To assess problems with multicollinearity, we tested additional models that did not 
simultaneously include the rent, the percentage of migrants and the median income of the 
neighbourhood, but the results from these additional models were similar.
8
 All metric 
variables have been grand-mean centred. 
Results 
Table 1, which contains the descriptive statistics, shows that discrimination against ethnic 
minorities on the rental market is quite common: at least one of the ethnic minority test 
persons was discriminated against in 19.0% of the properties. This is somewhat lower than 
numbers of net discrimination against Arabic men in Sweden, with figures of up to 1/4 of the 
cases (Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2008), but comparable to discrimination of Moroccan men in 
Spain (Bosch et al. 2010). On the one hand, this difference might be partially attributed to the 
difference in methodology—a telephone versus Internet audit—but on the other hand, it might 
be attributed to the conservative test we conducted. By providing a very suitable fictitious 
identity, we reduced the likelihood of ethnic discrimination to a minimum. Although no 
information was supplied unless specifically asked for, our ethnic minority test persons were 
asked questions about various background characteristics—employment, income, marital 
state, children and so forth—more often than the control person. If we add this form of 
unequal treatment to the direct discrimination, our ethnic minority test persons were treated 
unequally in 33.6% of the properties. Given that we supplied a positive fictitious identity, it is 
not unlikely that ethnic discrimination would be higher for ethnic minorities with less 
favourable background characteristics. Previous research indeed reported a reduction in ethnic 
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discrimination if background information is supplied (Bosch et al. 2010). Therefore, it is more 
likely that we have underestimated rather than overestimated discrimination against ethnic 
minorities in the rental housing market. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
To test our first hypothesis, which predicted less discrimination for ethnic minorities who 
master the host society language better (H1), we look at the proportions discrimination against 
ethnic minorities with and without accent in table 1. Ethnic minorities with an accent are 
discriminated against in 15.5% of the properties, whereas ethnic minorities without an accent 
are discriminated somewhat less often, in 12.4% of the properties. This difference of 3.1% is, 
however, insignificant (z = 1.522; p = 0.128). This finding is in contradiction with previous 
research in the U.S., where Hispanic candidates with a lower English proficiency are 
discriminated more often (Hanson and Santas forthcoming). Therefore, we conclude that our 
first hypothesis is not supported by our results: host society language mastery does not protect 
against ethnic discrimination. Apparently, perceived differences in migrant integration do not 
lead to a lower occurrence of ethnic discrimination against second-generation migrants. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
To test our second hypothesis, which posed a higher occurrence of ethnic discrimination for 
the top tier of the rent segment (H2), we look at the relationship between rent and 
discrimination. Our models indicate that there is a curvilinear relationship between the rent of 
a property and the odds of being discriminated against as an ethnic minority. Figure 1 gives an 
illustration of this relationship. The log odds of being discriminated against are highest for the 
cheapest properties, lowest for more expensive properties and again higher for very expensive 
properties. This is contrary to our expectations and therefore we reject our second hypothesis 
as well. This effect of rent might have important socioeconomic implications for ethnic 
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minorities, however: because of the increased discrimination in the cheaper segments of the 
housing market, the choice of available properties is more restricted for minorities with 
weaker socioeconomic positions. This may force ethnic minorities into renting more 
expensive properties, thus further weakening their socioeconomic position. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
To test our third hypothesis—whether discrimination is more common in neighbourhoods 
where less ethnic minorities live (H3)—we looked at the effect of the percentage of migrants 
in the neighbourhood. To test the occurrence of so-called ‘tipping points’ we test a curvilinear 
relationship between the percentage of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood and 
discrimination.
9
 There appears to be no association between neighbourhood segregation and 
discrimination against ethnic minorities. Contrary to previous research in the U.S. (Hanson 
and Hawley 2011; Ondrich et al. 2003; Page 1995), ethnic minorities do not run a greater risk 
of being discriminated against in neighbourhoods with fewer ethnic minorities. In the U.S., 
ethnic discrimination in the housing market may be due to lessors trying to prevent 
neighbourhoods crossing the tipping point (Hanson and Hawley 2011); this is not the case 
here. Therefore, we conclude that our third hypothesis is not supported by the results and that 
ethnic discrimination is not linked to ethnic residential segregation. 
The absence of a relation between the presence of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood and 
ethnic discrimination may be due to the relation between discrimination and socioeconomic 
segregation. In our fourth hypothesis, we predicted a positive association between 
neighbourhood wealth and ethnic discrimination (H4). We assessed the influence of the 
median income of the neighbourhood on the odds of discrimination. Again, as with the result 
for ethnic segregation, we can find no association between socioeconomic segregation and 
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ethnic discrimination. Contrary to our predictions, discrimination does not occur more 
frequently in neighbourhoods where inhabitants have stronger socioeconomic positions. 
Therefore, we can conclude that this hypothesis is also not supported by the results and we 
find no indications of an association between the socioeconomic background of the 
neighbourhood and ethnic discrimination. Additional analyses
10
 revealed that the link between 
segregation and discrimination is also absent without controlling for rent. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper, we focused on ethnic discrimination in the rental housing market. We assessed 
the prevalence of discrimination, possible differences in discrimination due to host society 
language proficiency, rent and the link between ethnic and socioeconomic residential 
segregation and discrimination. A telephone audit survey was conducted, resulting in data on 
579 properties for rent in Antwerp and Ghent. The data for this survey were analysed using 
logistic multilevel models to simultaneously model the influences on ethnic discrimination for 
ethnic minorities. The results led to three interesting conclusions. 
First, discrimination of ethnic minorities in the rental housing market occurs quite frequently. 
Even from the initial telephone contact, almost 1 in 5 properties ethnic minorities were 
discriminated against: whereas ethnic Belgians were invited to visit the property, an ethnic 
minority candidate was not. These figures are somewhat lower than the findings of previous 
research in Sweden (Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2008), but comparable to findings regarding 
discrimination of Moroccan men in Spain (Bosch et al. 2010). However, if we consider other 
forms of unequal treatment, like asking additional information, our results are comparable to 
the higher numbers in Sweden. Given that we performed a conservative test of ethnic 
                                                 
10
 Not shown but available upon request from the authors. 
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discrimination and only focused on the first telephone contact, our findings probably represent 
an underestimation of ethnic discrimination during the whole trajectory of a candidate’s 
housing search. Notwithstanding the illegal status of discrimination, the high prevalence and 
the widely known negative consequences of ethnic discrimination should impel policy makers 
to tackle this important issue. 
Second, contrary to our expectations, discrimination against migrants who master the 
language of the host society better is not less common than it is for those who have lower 
language proficiency. Moreover, the characteristics of the property and the neighbourhood of 
the property affect discrimination against both migrant groups in a similar way.
11
 A perfect 
mastery of the local language does not protect against discrimination. Although previous 
research in the U.S. did find an association between assimilation and ethnic discrimination 
(Hanson and Hawley 2011; Hanson and Santas forthcoming), our results are in line with 
research regarding Arab minorities in Italy (Baldini and Federici 2011), for whom written-
language mastery did not reduce discrimination. Given that host society language proficiency 
is often associated with being a recent immigrant or a more integrated immigrant, this 
indicates that integration does not affect the probability of being discriminated against. As 
public discourse warrants against a rejection of the Western culture by second generation 
migrants (Lucassen 2005), this might cause the absence of a difference due to language 
proficiency. Since negative effects of perceived ethnic discrimination are often worse for 
better integrated second- than for first-generation migrants in a wide spectrum of different 
domains (Alba 2005), ethnic discrimination in the housing market might have even more 
detrimental effects for those better integrated second- generation migrants. 
Third, we did not find an association between the percentage of ethnic minorities or 
neighbourhood wealth and ethnic discrimination. This contradicts the findings of previous 
                                                 
11
 Analyses not shown but available upon request from the authors. 
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research in the U.S. (Hanson and Hawley 2011; Ondrich et al. 2003; Page 1995), where 
discrimination tends to be higher in neighbourhoods at the tipping point of ethnic residential 
segregation. The fact that we do not find the same effect in Europe may be due to the lower 
levels of ethnic residential segregation (Van Kempen and Murie 2009). Awareness of 
segregation may therefore be lower and attempts by lessors to reduce segregation around this 
tipping point, less common. If a relation between segregation and discrimination is found, this 
is assumed to influence segregation in the long term: when discrimination occurs more often 
in white neighbourhoods, segregation will be perpetuated through time. Given that we did not 
find this relationship, it seems unlikely that persistence of segregation through time is caused 
by ethnic discrimination in the rental market. We did find a socioeconomic gradient in spite of 
the absence of a relation between discrimination and socioeconomic segregation. This may 
indicate another negative effect of ethnic discrimination for minorities. Discrimination occurs 
more frequently for cheaper property. This may increase housing costs for ethnic minorities at 
the bottom of the rental housing market, creating additional difficulties for those in an already 
weak position. 
One of the main limitations of our survey is inherent to the applied research design. 
Telephone audits have been subject to some criticism (Pager 2007): working with real test 
persons is less standardized than Internet surveys, which have become increasingly popular in 
recent years. Furthermore, if informed of the purpose of the research, test persons may adapt 
their behaviour. However, we reduced the influence of both the lack of standardization and 
the tendency to adapt behaviour by actively screening the test persons during the course of the 
research. Moreover, telephone surveys are more appropriate than written conversations for 
testing differences based on accents and language proficiency in discrimination.  
A second shortcoming of our study is that we mapped only the very early stages of a 
candidate’s effort to rent a property. Discrimination may occur at any time throughout the 
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rental process, from first contact to the end of the rental period. Previous research has also 
indicated that discrimination is common during other steps in the process (Roscigno et al. 
2009). Because of feasibility issues, however, we were unable to monitor the whole process.  
The third shortcoming is related to the structure of the housing market in Belgium. Given that 
Belgium is predominantly a buyers’ market, we monitored discrimination only in a limited 
segment of the housing market. Further research would do well to examine ethnic 
discrimination for candidates who intend to buy as well, and could be extended to examining 
discrimination among credit institutions (Pager and Shepherd 2008). 
The fourth and final shortcoming is that we were unable to verify the ethnic background of 
landlords and real estate agents. Only if the test persons discerned a noticeable accent during 
the telephone calls, a possible foreign background of lessors was registered. This was the case 
in only 9 properties. However, ethnic minority lessors might be situated more in 
neighbourhoods with a higher percentage of ethnic minorities. Therefore, a higher number of 
ethnic minority lessors might obfuscate the relation between discrimination and segregation, 
as we would expect ethnic minority discrimination to be less common among ethnic minority 
lessors. However, given that we have gathered a real-time sample of available property, our 
results should reflect the real-life circumstances of trying to rent a property for ethnic 
minorities, including from ethnic minority lessors.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Range N (%) 
    Ave. (Std.) 
Dependent 
   Ethnic Discrimination 
   No direct discrimination 0/1 469 (81.0%) 
Direct discrimination 0/1 110 (19.0%) 
    With Accent 
   No direct discrimination 0/1 489 (84.5%) 
Direct discrimination 0/1 90 (15.5%) 
No Accent 
   No direct discrimination 0/1 507 (87.6%) 
Direct discrimination 0/1 72 (12.4%) 
    Independent 
   Type 
   Studio Appartment 0/1 57 (9.8%) 
Appartment 0/1 447 (77.2%) 
House 0/1 75 (13.0%) 
Rent 325-1,950 762.5 (240.80) 
Size 0-6 1.74 (0.85) 
Lessor 
   Real estate agent 0/1 186 (32.1%) 
Landlord 0/1 393 (67.9%) 
City 
   Antwerp 0/1 356 (61.5%) 
Ghent 0/1 223 (38.5%) 
    Neighborhood characteristics 
   Percentage migrants 1.3-79.4 30.9 (32.8) 
Median income 12,044-32,167 20,009.00 (3,188.10) 
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Table 2. Logistic multivariate multilevel models of ethnic discrimination in the rental 
housing market 
 
Null-model 
 
Full model 
  Coef.   (Std. Err.) 
 
Coef.   (Std. Err.) 
Intercept -1.567 *** (0.129) 
 
-2.436 *** (0.474) 
       Property characteristics 
      Type 
     Studio apartment 
   
0.226 
 
(0.414) 
Apartment 
   
0.451 
 
(0.590) 
House 
   
Ref. 
  Rent 
   
-0.310 *** (0.091) 
Rent² 
   
0.031 ** (0.012) 
Size 
   
0.216 
 
(0.190) 
Real estate agent 
   
0.154 
 
(0.281) 
Ghent 
   
1.053 ** (0.397) 
      Neighbourhood characteristics 
     Percentage migrants 
   
0.010 
 
(0.015) 
Percentage migrants² 
   
0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Median income 
   
0.059 
 
(0.623) 
      Variance 
     Neighbourhood 0.511 
 
(0.276) 
 
0.324 
 
(0.623) 
Property 3.290 
  
  3.290    
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-sided); Nproperties = 579; Nneighbourhoods = 199. 
 
 
. 
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Figure 1. The effect of rent on the log odds of being discriminated against for ethnic minorities 
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